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SETTING THE SCENE:  
NON-STATE COLLECTIVES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Much new work on the making and unmaking of empires has exposed 
the pivotal role of companies and “private” actors with complex 
relationships to states and sovereigns.1 Yet trading companies and other 
commercial entities were not the only “corporate” formations stalking 
imperial sovereignty and its dismantling. 
When empires end, to whom or what do they pass sovereignty? The 
difficulties associated with this deceptively simple question are baked into 
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 1.  For the making, see, e.g., STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES: CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN 
EUROPE’S SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (2017); PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE 
SOVEREIGNTY & THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA (2011); ADAM 
CLULOW, THE COMPANY AND THE SHOGUN: THE DUTCH ENCOUNTER WITH TOKUGAWA JAPAN (2014); 
Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Justification of King Leopold II’s Congo Enterprise by Sir Travers Twiss, in 
LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITISH COLONIAL THOUGHT: TRANSPOSITIONS OF EMPIRE 109–26 (Shaunnagh 
Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds., 2010). For the unmaking, see, e.g., Susan Pedersen, Getting Out of Iraq—in 
1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood, 155 AM. HIST. REV. 975, 975–1000 
(2010); Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, 
and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 513, 514 (2002). 
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the concepts used to describe and justify the process itself – especially the 
“right to self-determination.” An international right to self-determination 
presumes the existence of an international “person” to whom such a right can 
attach: yet the very premise of a claim to self-determination is that 
international personhood has been unjustly denied to the community in 
question up to that point. The right thus seems to imply the existence of a 
shadowy, pre-state, corporate thing with some sort of inchoate standing in 
international law, even as it is simultaneously premised on the non-existence 
of this same thing.2 
When the Eurasian land empires collapsed at the end of the First World 
War, and a new order based on “self-determination” was proclaimed, this 
“thing” or juridical person was colloquially understood to be a “nation.” 
Were “nations” legal persons of a sort, capable of possessing international 
rights? However dubious in theory, this construction proved even less 
plausible when applied to the actual successor states of the Habsburg Empire, 
which emerged onto the international stage riddled with as much ethnic 
diversity as the empire itself. 
To complicate matters further, the new states of Central and Eastern 
Europe were saddled at birth with international treaties that safeguarded the 
rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities residing within their 
borders. If the new minorities protection regime thus undermined the idea of 
a single, state-forming nation by acknowledging the fragmentation of the 
body politic, it re-introduced the question of the international legal 
personhood of ethnic groups on a sub-state scale.3 Under the treaties, ethnic 
minorities seemingly possessed international rights: did that not imply that 
these collectives were corporate legal persons under international law, 
separate from the states in which they lived? Today we think of the interwar 
minorities regime as an era of innovative group rights which subsequently 
gave way to an alternate system built on individual rights in the wake of the 
Second World War.4 Yet it was the very “groupness” of those interwar rights 
that aroused endless controversy and dissent while they were in operation. 
 
 2.  See generally Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and 
International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 51 (1988). 
 3.  The connection between self-determination and minorities rights are more complex (both for 
actors at the time and historiographically) than I can discuss here. Some interwar jurists, for example, 
understood minority rights as compensation metered out in cases where full self-determining statehood 
was not possible. See, e.g., CARL GEORGE BRUNS, GRUNDLAGEN UND ENTWICKLUNG DES 
INTERNATIONALEN MINDERHEITENRECHTS: EIN UEBERSICHT 16 (1929); JACOB STOYANOVSKY, THE 
MANDATE FOR PALESTINE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
MANDATES 54 (1928). 
 4.  On the mid-century tussle between individual and collective rights, see generally, among 
others, Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950, 47 HIST. J. 379 (2004); 
PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET: ON THE ORIGINS OF “GENOCIDE” AND “CRIMES AGAINST 
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In what follows, I use the legal fogginess of these collective rights as an 
historical opening – a kind of historiographical sticky spot that leans in to a 
series of different conceptualizations and periodizations. It prompts us to 
think about minority rights not “forwards,” through a comparison with 
postwar international human rights, but “backwards,” through a deeper 
imperial genealogy. The whole question of the juridical subjectivity of ethnic 
groups was, it turns out, an old and weary theme in the Habsburg lands, one 
that knots the history of international law back into that of imperial 
constitutional law. This longer regional history changes both sides of the 
story, reciprocally: if it allows us to re-“place” or re-ground this chapter of 
the history of international law, and counter international law’s cultivated 
placelessness, it also exposes the experimental visions of “international” law 
coursing through the veins of imperial jurisprudence. 
I. A MAGNA CARTA FOR EAST CENTRAL EUROPE (OR, THE 
PROBLEM WITH THE LEAGUE’S MINORITIES TREATIES) 
Looking eastwards from his perch at the University of Vienna in 1937, 
Alfred Verdross thought he knew how to soothe the region’s unrest. A 
former Kelsen student, the distinguished Austrian jurist had made his name 
in the years after World War One by extending the monism of the Vienna 
School to the sphere of international law. Disquiet in East Central Europe, 
he now argued, was the inevitable result of categorical errors introduced by 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and embedded in the international 
settlement it midwifed: a regime with an invisible subject, or — a system of 
minorities protection in which “minorities” did not exist. 
Verdross reminded his readers that the minorities treaties did not define 
the concept of minority and referred only to members of ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious minorities. “The positive international law of minority rights is 
thereby constructed individualistically, rather than universally. Not them, but 
those belonging to the minorities are awarded rights.”5 Nowhere in the 
treaties did “a minority” as such possess a right. Small wonder, perhaps: 
genuine rights-bearing legal collectivities raised the specter of states within 
states, of unruly nested sovereignties, which representatives of the new states 
predictably resisted at all costs.6 More philosophically, the construction of 
ethnic/national groups as unified legal persons in possession of international 
 
HUMANITY” (2016). On new ways of linking minority rights and group rights, see forthcoming work by 
León Castellanos Jankiewicz. 
 5.  ALFRED VERDROSS, VÖLKERRECHT 226 (1937) (emphasis in original).  
 6.  Some early proposals for the minorities treaties recognized minorities as “distinct public 
corporations.” See Nathaniel Berman, The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal 
History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 41 (David Wippman ed., 1998). 
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rights would challenge the foundations of a state-centric international law. If 
minorities truly possessed international subjectivity, reasoned Rudolf Laun 
– another Austrian jurist of the period – “then the whole image of the 
community of international law would be essentially transformed.”7 
It was this legal denial of the juridical subjectivity of the group that 
Verdross understood as a major geographical-categorical error. He argued 
that the premise of the treaties — that it was plausible (legally and otherwise) 
to understand minorities as a collected mass of individuals — may be well 
suited to West and Central Europe, but was dangerously misconceived for 
the “belt of mixed peoples of the European east.” His prescription was 
specific: 
A pacification [Befriedung] of the European east can only be achieved if 
the principle of the equal rights of ethnicities [Gleichberechtigung der 
Volksstämme] laid down in article 19 of the old-Austrian constitution 
regarding the general rights of citizens (1867) is elevated to the Magna 
Carta of Eastern Europe.8 
On the cusp of the Second World War, Eastern Europe cried out for the 
resurrection of Habsburg constitutional law — at least according to 
Verdross. The rights languages of the empire’s nationalities law were far 
better adapted to the prose of life in this region than the misconceived 
platform of individual rights cooked up and imposed through the new 
international settlement. Article 19 of Austria’s last major constitution could 
thus be recalled into service as a kind of supranational regional charter of 
rights indigenous to the region itself. 
The peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups cohabiting in close 
proximity, he explained, could be achieved only if each group possessed an 
equal right to the protection and cultivation of their ethnicity and language. 
“But because culture is only possible in the community, mere individual 
rights are not sufficient, it is far more necessary to recognize rights of the 
ethnic group [Volksgruppenrecht]. Pursuant to this, the rights of minorities 
must be rebuilt into the rights of ethnic groups.”9 In 1936, the nationalities 
 
 7.  MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FÜR VÖLKERRECHT: HEFT 7, 32 (1926), 
http://digital.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/werkansicht?PPN=PPN860664945&PHYSID=PHYS_0005& 
DMDID=DMDLOG_0001 (Rudolf Laun at the Siebente Jahreversammlung of the Deutschen 
Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, in the discussion on 27 May 1926, following G. Ebers, “Sind im Völkerrecht 
allein die Staaten parteifähig?”). On international legal personality in this period, see generally Natasha 
Wheatley, Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of Not Being a State, 
35 LAW & HIST. REV. 753 (2017). 
 8.  VERDROSS, supra note 5, at 230–31 (emphasis in original).  
 9.  Id. (emphasis in original). For a survey of the jurisprudence of “Volksgruppenrecht” in the 
1920s and 30s, see Samuel Salzborn, ‘Volksgruppenrecht’: Zum Transfer(versuch) eines politischen 
Paradigmas in das Europäische Minderheitenrecht, in RECHTSTRANSFER IN DER GESCHICHTE / LEGAL 
TRANSFER IN HISTORY 44–63 (Vanessa Duss et al. eds., 2006). 
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congress had come to the same conclusion, declaring their impatience with 
individual rights and the necessity of new corporate legal bodies. “All 
cultural work is communal work, all national rights are communal rights,” 
the congress declared in its resolutions that year. “For that reason, a true 
nationalities law that does not recognize national minorities as collective 
unities and legal subjects is unthinkable.”10 
Verdross was not alone in comparing the minorities treaties unfavorably 
to article 19 of the old imperial Austrian Constitution.11 He shared with other 
jurists of the period a frustration with the notion that his native region needed 
to take legal lessons on the rights of national minorities from the Allied 
powers. The Habsburg Empire had been a bustling laboratory for 
conceptions and schemes of nationality rights and group legal subjectivity. 
Yet as the empire collapsed at the fiery end of the world war, Austria had 
been rebranded a backward prison house of nations, and its former territories 
transformed into a different sort of laboratory – a testing ground and zone of 
tutelage for new international rights that withheld sovereignty’s full 
splendor. On the knife edge of war’s end, the region had gone from the 
subject of (inter)national legal innovation to its object – a site of disciplinary 
regulation and (perceived) humiliation.12 Verdross tried to square the circle 
and reclaim the Habsburg lands as legal protagonists rather than guinea pigs 
in the twentieth-century history of rights. 
Nor was he alone in arguing that the demographic particularities of the 
region required different ways of conceptualizing rights, personhood, and 
sovereignty. As the Austrian historian Harold Steinacker explained in 1934, 
“we have here an over-one-another rather than next-to-one-another, an 
overlayering [Überschichtung] of peoples [Volkstümer].”13 What could the 
one-dimensional geographies of sovereignty, or an anemic, individualized 
minority regime mean in the world of this overlayering? What might 
 
 10.  VERDROSS, supra note 5, at 231 (quoting Resolutions of the XII Nationalities Congress, held 
in Geneva in September 1936). 
 11.  Hans Kelsen (for example) considered rights guaranteed in the new Austria through the 
Minderheitenschutz norms of the Treaty of St. Germain and observed that they did not go further than 
article 19, and in fact remained a little behind, “als die Einführung einer Staatssprache ausdrücklich 
zugelassen wird.” HANS KELSEN, ÖSTERREICHISCHES STAATSRECHT: EIN GRUNDRISS 
ENTWICKLUNGSGESCHICHTLICH DARGESTELLT 63 (1923). 
 12.  See Jane Cowan, Who’s Afraid of Violent Language?: Honour, Sovereignty, and Claims-
Making in the League of Nations, ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 271, 271–91 (2003) (discussing the 
Foucauldian overtones of the minorities regime).  
 13.  Harold Steinacker, Die geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen des österreichischen 
Nationalitätenproblems und seine Entwicklung bis 1867, in DAS NATIONALITÄTENRECHT DES ALTEN 
ÖSTERREICH 4–5 (Karl Gottfried Hugelmann ed., 1934) (“Hier haben wir große Schwankungen der 
Sprachgrenzen und des Zahlenverhältnisses in den Mischgebieten. Vor allem haben wir statt des 
Nebeneinander ein Übereinander, eine Überschichtung der Volkstümer.”)  
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international law look like if it was written out of that overlayering, rather 
than applied from the outside and after the fact, in a doomed attempt to sort 
its geological architecture into a flat legal geometry? 
If we track the evolving jurisprudence of collective rights out of the 
cradle of Habsburg constitutional law and into the world of interwar minority 
protection, we glimpse how the problem of group legal personality 
repeatedly spurred visions of alternate versions of international law 
indigenous to East Central Europe. Time and again, conceptions of collective 
rights spiraled off into bold re-imaginings of the very idea of international 
law. If people were dispersed and mobile and layered, could law be so too? 
What did sovereignty mean in such circumstances? Or territory, for that 
matter? Could both be superseded? The sharp line between international and 
domestic jurisdictions itself seemed part of the problem, as a string of 
thinkers proposed different iterations of an “internal international law” or 
“internal supranational legal order.” 
II. (GROUP) RIGHTS WITHOUT SUBJECTS (AGAIN):  
THE EMPIRE’S CONSTITUTIONAL MYSTERIES 
There was more than a little irony to Verdross’s impassioned recall of 
Austrian nationalities law as a model for true collective rights. His invocation 
depended on a certain forgetting of its own. For it was precisely the 
difficulties of recognizing nations or peoples as legal persons that had 
preoccupied generations of Austro-Hungarian jurists. Section 19 of the 1867 
constitution had announced that all ethnicities were equal in their rights and 
possessed the inviolable right to cultivate their language and nationality. But 
these ostensibly collective rights lacked an obvious subject to wield them: 
the law did not name, define, or constitute “ethnicities” or “nations” as legal 
entities. It was precisely the gap between the formal fact of these rights and 
the legal opacity of their bearers that proved such thorny (if fertile) terrain 
for Habsburg legal thinkers. 
Faced with this constitutional provision – which quickly became the 
basis for myriad regional claims and complaints14 – many jurists threw up 
their hands. The prominent Graz professor Ludwig Gumplowicz shook his 
head: “‘ethnicities’ are neither physical nor juridical persons, and therefore 
 
 14.  In this way, imperial law ironically played a role in producing national communities, especially 
by spurring conceptions of nationality that focused on language use. See Pieter Judson, THE HABSBURG 
EMPIRE: A NEW HISTORY (2016); See Tara Zahra, KIDNAPPED SOULS: NATIONAL INDIFFERENCE AND 
THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN IN THE BOHEMIAN LANDS, 1900-1948 (2008). 
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as such can never assert what ever rights.”15 He therefore classed this 
provision as a mere general principle that could never be implemented 
without further legislative elaboration. Edmund Bernatzik, another doyen of 
Habsburg constitutional law, argued in parallel that nationalities could not 
form legal persons because they did not have the necessary unified and 
organized will. Faced with the constitution’s vague formulation, he 
maintained, one must immediately ask “who then is the subject of such a 
celebrated, ‘inviolable’ right, if it cannot be the nationality as such?”16 He 
offered no solution to the problem. 
So, these constitutionally guaranteed rights were in need of a subject.17 
They populated constitutional law like ghosts: disembodied legal signs 
without “persons” to carry them. Georg Jellinek could only blame the 
drafting. “This article has a very unlegal style [unjuristisch stilisirt],” he 
complained in 1892, “in that ethnicities that do not possess personality and 
languages that could never become legal subjects are granted ‘rights.’” 
Further legislative elaboration was required “to designate the legal subjects 
who are to be granted an entitlement in this area.”18 Adolf Exner, a scholar 
of Roman law and Rudolf von Ihering’s successor at (and future rector of) 
the University of Vienna, spoke on the subject at the Wiener Juristische 
Gesellschaft in 1892. “If one examines article 19, the absence of a legal 
subject is already apparent. Ethnicities are not juridical persons; in the first 
instance it is not even possible to objectively determine who belongs to an 
 
 15.  Ludwig Gumplowicz, DAS OESTERREICHISCHE STAATSRECHT (VERFASSUNGS- UND 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT): EIN LEHR- UND HANDBUCH 29 (Vienna: Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und 
Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1891). 
 16.  Edmund Bernatzik,DIE JURISRISCHE PERSÖNLICHKEIT DER BEHÖRDEN; ZUGLEICH EIN 
BEITRAG ZUR THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN PERSONEN 100, n. 259 (Freiburg: Akademische 
Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1890) 
 17.  Gerhard Stourzh has argued that although nations were never organized into legal persons, the 
rights granted under Section 19 of the Constitution did have meaning and affect, because collective claims 
were brought by municipal organizations or voluntary associations, for example, that represented national 
interests in a particular area even if they did not represent the totality of members of that national group. 
Thus the binary between individual citizens and organized nationalities fitted out with representative 
organs does not capture the political reality of old Austria. See Gerald Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung 
der Volkstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848-1918, in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, vol. 3., Die 
Völker des Reiches, part 2, 1149-57 (Adam Wandruszka & Peter Urbanitsch, eds., 1980). We could say 
that these were surrogate or placeholder legal personalities, that could treat the issues in a piecemeal 
fashion, local case by local case, rather than dealing with the question more structural legal terms for the 
empire as a whole. Of the new work on Habsburg nationalities law, see Börries Kuzmany, Habsburg 
Austria: Experiments in Non-Territorial Autonomy, 15 ETHNOPOLITICS 43, 43−65; Jeremy King, The 
Municipal and the National in the Bohemian Lands, 1848-1914, 42 AUSTRIAN HISTORY YEARBOOK 89, 
89−109 (2011). 
 18.  Georg Jellinek, SYSTEM DER SUBJEKTIVEN ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTE 94 (Freiburg: Akademische 
Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr 1892). 
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ethnicity.”19 Its “true nature,” he argued, was that of a “promissory law 
[Verheißungsgesetzes].” The word “inviolable” already pointed one in that 
direction. “Every right can be violated. But if it says in the state fundamental 
law that a right is inviolable, then that is a self-limitation on the will of the 
state [des Staatswillens], not a guarantee of individuals against a legal 
injury.”20 The state was speaking to itself, not ascribing rights to others. 
Exner’s solution to the specter of rights without subjects was to “discover” 
that the rights themselves did not exist in the first place: article 19 in fact 
housed the duties of the state rather than the rights of nations. 
Others found the notion of ethnicities/nations as legal persons far less 
perplexing. The great proponent of national federation and Czech politician 
František Palacký considered the problem at length. He later recounted that 
already in his famous letter to the 1848 Frankfurt parliament he had 
interpreted “each of the peoples [Völker], in the genetic meaning of the word, 
as particular personalities [besondere Persönlichkeiten],” with the right of 
association (Associationsrecht) as their primary means of protection. “The 
ideas already existed; all difficulties concerned simply the embodiment 
[Verkörperung] and grouping of these into concrete and organic wholes.”21 
How were fluid and dispersed “peoples” to be solidified into singular 
subjects? 
Palacký’s approach was both pragmatic and revealing. In 1866, he 
ruminated on the “reality” of national groups as distinct from states: 
Is each nation, in its totality, a moral and legal person, or not? I think that 
at least among thinkers there can exist no controversy about that. Nations 
such as, for example, Bohemians, Poles, Hungarians, Germans and so on 
are genuine realities, are particular and dynamic wholes, of which each 
possesses its own particular consciousness, its will, its own interests and 
therefore also duties; in brief, they are real moral and legal persons.22 
No one would deny, he felt, that Germans who lived in Austria, Prussia, 
Russia, and France had their own common national interests and friendly 
understanding, even as their respective governments may rage against one 
another. If Palacký foreshadowed the irredentism of the interwar years, he 
also hinted at a necessary fluidity or overlap between imperial and 
international law in Central Europe: 
That the theory of international rights in the above described sense of the 
 
 19.  Adolf Exner, Subjective Rechte aus Artikel 19des Staatsgrundgesetzes über die allgemeinen 
Rechte der Staatsbürger, 49 JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER 583 (1892). 
 20. Id. at 584. 
 21.  František Palacký, POLITISCHES VERMÄCHTNISS 15 (Theodor Mourek ed., 2nd ed.1872) (“Die 
Ideen waren ziemlich früh vorhanden; alle Schwierigkeiten drehten sich nur um die Verkörperung und 
Grupirung [sic] derselben zu einem konkreten und organischen Ganzen.”). 
 22.  Id. at 14. 
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different ethnicities has not yet been developed, must obviously be 
attributed to the circumstance that scholars working on these rights, 
Englishmen, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Italians, and Germans, live in such 
lands in which the concepts “nation” and “state” more or less coincide.23 
He mused that the intellectual energy of his countrymen had been caught up 
elsewhere — in Slavic philology and the exact sciences. Had they turned 
their minds to nationalism and legal theory instead, he speculated, there 
would be a far more developed jurisprudence on the international rights of 
nationalities — rights that transcended sovereignty and attached to human 
groups rather than state borders; rights that were jurisdiction-queer. As 
viewed from the multiethnic polities of central Europe, international law 
would (and should) look quite different. As the century drew to a close and 
even more so after the empire collapsed, Central European jurists would 
develop precisely such a nuanced jurisprudence of (inter)national rights. 
III. PERSONALITY EXPLODING GEOGRAPHY:  
WE NEED A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW… 
Visions of new sorts of national rights that attached to peoples rather 
than territories bubbling up from Habsburg jurisprudence achieved a global 
fame as the platform of the Austro-Marxists (especially Karl Renner and 
Otto Bauer) at the turn of the century. But such visions had in fact entered 
the bloodstream of imperial constitutional debate already at its inception 
moment in the wake of the 1848 revolutions. One of the earliest proposals 
for a re-ordering of the empire along national lines came from a Rumanian 
delegation collectively representing Rumanians living across provincial 
frontiers in Transylvania, Hungary, the Banat, and the Bukovina. In a March 
1849 memoranda to the imperial government, the Rumanian delegation laid 
out a detailed plan for “the amalgamation of all Rumanians of the Austrian 
monarchy into a single independent nation, under the Austrian scepter, as an 
integral component of the unified monarchy.”24 While stressing their loyalty 
to the monarchy, they sought an “independent national administration” so 
that they might exercise the right to free national development, as guaranteed 
by the crown.25 This independence would pertain only to internal 
administration against the other nations of the monarchy. No nation should 
be subordinate to another. This principle meant that the realization of the 
national equality of rights would be possible only if 
each particular nation is left to group itself into a single center over and 
 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  EUGEN BROTE, DIE RUMÄNISCHE FRAGE IN SIEBENBÜRGEN UND UNGARN: EINE POLITISCHE 
DENKSCHRIFT 177 (1895). 
 25.  Id. at 181. 
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against the remaining nations, roughly in the method of the ecclesiastical 
organization for the members of different confessions, without 
consideration of the previous provincial division, and without great 
consideration for territory in general.26 
Genuine equality of national rights required the old provincial borders to be 
dissolved, the logic of minorities and majorities superseded and, 
portentously, territory itself to fade in importance. The tyranny of geography 
would no longer prevent a dispersed and intermingled population from 
appearing as a single administrative unit. 
The associational logic of confessional communities was likewise 
invoked by the Austro-Marxists half a century later in their bold model for a 
reformed imperial political structure that superseded territory altogether. In 
their respective works Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie 
(1907) and Staat und Nation (1899), Otto Bauer and Karl Renner famously 
elaborated a federal vision for the empire built around the so-called 
“personality principle.” They argued that national collectives could be 
constituted non-territorially among co-nationals, wherever they happened to 
live, through a curia system analogous to church membership. For all its 
thickness and scope, the literature on Austro-Marxist cultural autonomy has 
focused less on its place within an imperial (and subsequently international) 
jurisprudence of legal personality. At its core, the personality principle in 
fact constituted a discourse on the art of having rights, on making (dispersed, 
overlayered) nations “visible” in law. 
“As is well known,” Renner wrote, “the nations in Austria do not have 
juridical personality, nor any other sort of legally graspable collective 
presence. Current law does not know the nation, but rather only nationality 
as a distinctive characteristic of the individual.”27 (Verdross ventriloquized 
this complaint in 1937.) Yet Renner, like his colleagues, eschewed the most 
obvious way of making a nation visible in law — that is, through a sovereign 
nation-state. They viewed an “international legal order” based on “national 
autonomy” to be a far superior model.28 To achieve this, he elaborated the 
legal idea of a nation within a federally-organized Nationalitätenstaat. New 
legal forms and formations (Rechtsformen) needed to be constructed for this 
new “internal supranational legal order [innerstaatliche übernationale 
Rechtsordnung].”29 Few models were available for the craftsmen of these 
new juristische Formen. Scholars in the field should have been far more 
 
 26.  Id. at 179. 
 27.  KARL RENNER, DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT DER NATIONEN IN 
BESONDERER ANWENDUNG AUF OESTERREICH (1918). 
 28. Id. at 29ff. 
 29.  Id. at 36. 
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inquisitive about the wide variety of forms that state and nation might take. 
It was time, Renner announced, for a new constitutional work.30 
Crucially, this new work required moving beyond a liberal paradigm in 
which national particularities belonged only to the individual, and beyond a 
territorial understanding of jurisdiction.31 Any solution based on individual 
rights was insufficient. “The national problem is not just and not in the first 
instance an economic-social or a language question, but a constitutional-
political question that seizes the whole state organization.”32 Nations sought 
a portion of the state’s functions, they wanted power. Nations must be “state 
legal factors [staatliche Rechtsfaktoren], constitutional potencies or, to utter 
the dreaded phrase, states within states, if peace and progress is to return to 
Austria.”33 These states within states could not be built upon territorial 
foundations, not only because language groups did not inhabit discrete, 
hermetic areas, but also because such an approach misunderstood the nature 
of nationality: an individual did not “leave” the nation when he or she left 
the territory, nor did he or she “enter” it upon traversing a certain geographic 
domain.34 A far more fluid solution was required, in which law attached to 
people rather than land — in which jurisdiction could roam with human 
bodies. 
How were dispersed, mobile people to mimic the legal fixity of territory 
as a jurisdiction? A nation must be transformed into an “autonomous body, 
into a juridical person with its own actionable, judicially-protected 
subjective rights.” In other words, it was to be become a “private and public 
law person, capable of acting in law, entitled to claim and to have claims 
[brought] against it.”35 Renner viewed such subjecthood as the only method 
of making national rights meaningful. Like so many other Habsburg jurists 
before him, Renner critiqued the legal construction of Section 19 of the 
constitution that granted national rights without having organized “nations” 
as legal subjects. Rights without subjects were unenforceable and thus 
meaningless. In his words, the “question of the bearer of rights” lay at the 
core.36 
In distributing law according to demography rather than geography, the 
Austro-Marxist program conjured the prospect of states without territory. 
 
 30.  Id. at 38–39. 
 31.  Id. at 40–41. 
 32.  Id. at 67. 
 33.  Id. at 69. 
 34.  Id. at 74. 
 35.  RENNER, supra note 27, at 78. 
 36.  RENNER, supra note 27, at 118, 136 (“die Nation als freie Einheit, als juristische Person des 
privaten und als Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechtes organisiert werden muss, wenn ihr in Wahrheit 
die Rechte zukommen sollen, die ihr vermeint sind”). 
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What were rights without land? Commentators worried about the 
implications for legal theory and authority. The politician and erstwhile trade 
minister Joseph Maria Baernreither was quick to identify the radical stakes 
of the Austro-Marxist schema. Bauer and his colleagues, Baernreither 
observed in 1910, wanted to construe nationality as a “personal union” 
(Personalverband) rather than a “territorial body” (Gebietskörperschaft). If 
“the nation must become a legal subject” in this way, then “a relationship 
must be established between the individual national-comrade 
[Volksgenossen] and the nation which is like that existing today between a 
citizen and the state.”37 What is more, “this new legal subject, the organized 
nation” must then possess organs so that it could make use of the rights 
granted to it; one would need judges who could preside over this new area 
of law. Such developments would amount to “a partial transvaluation of our 
state law [Staatsrecht] into a nations law [Nationsrecht].”38 The whole basis 
of constitutional law would shift. They would be states within the state — if 
not against the state, Baernreither warned. 
The wholesale transformation of the law of states — and the classical 
distinction between municipal and international law — was in fact precisely 
Renner’s point. In his own terms, this new legal order represented an 
“architectonic work.”39 He conceived the autonomy program as hybrid blend 
of domestic and international law — a means of inviting supranational law 
into the imperial fold. As he put it in The Self-Determination of Nations with 
Particular Application to Austria, perhaps the most complete articulation of 
his program, published in 1918 (with a preface dated December 1917): 
Incontestably, this country, despite its objectionable constitutional 
backwardness in all other things, has made in this area the first and most 
interesting attempts at an internal international law [innerstaatlichen 
Völkerrechtes], it can count as a field of experimentation for internal 
internationalism, and therefore has a high interest for legal research as well 
as political praxis.40 
It was the international law of the empire. Palacký’s prophesy — that a 
theory of the international rights of nations would most obviously originate 
in a polity like Austria-Hungary — had in some senses come true. 
Through the keyhole of this alternative pre-history to the jurisprudence 
of interwar minority rights, the history of international law need not 
necessarily start or end with international law. Scholars who analyze the 
 
 37.  JOSEPH MARIA BAERNREITHER, ZUR BÖHMISCHEN FRAGE: EINE POLITISCHE STUDIE 13–14 
(1910). 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  RENNER, supra note 27, at 146. 
 40.  Id. at Preface (this text was a much revised and re-titled second edition of his earlier work 
RUDOLF SPRINGER, DER KAMPFDER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN NATIONEN UM DEN STAAT (1902)). 
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interwar minorities regime solely within the frame and jurisdiction of 
international law understandably focus on the 1878 Treaty of Berlin as the 
pivotal precedent: a moment in which the Great Powers made the recognition 
of new Balkan states dependent on commitments to respect minorities (albeit 
of the religious rather than linguistic/national variety).41 Yet for many jurists 
and public figures “on the ground” in Central Europe between the wars, the 
problems raised by the minorities treaties formed a continuity with 
longstanding Habsburg debates about how to turn sub-state ethnic/national 
groups into units protected by law — debates that were always also about 
the legal architecture and jurisdictional structure best suited to the region’s 
kaleidoscopic diversity. In 1918–19, in the wake of the empire’s collapse, 
that conversation migrated from the jurisdiction of imperial constitutional 
law to that of international law, and the Habsburg jurisprudence on nations 
as legal persons morphed into the “secondary literature” for theories of 
international minority rights.42 Yet this jurisdictional mutation was not only 
sequential and historical: from its inception in the Habsburg constitutional 
debates of 1848–49, the question had always threatened to bend and break 
traditional conceptions of jurisdiction altogether, and blur any clear line 
between “domestic” and “international” domains. As Palacký and Renner 
had already suggested, the creation of ethnic/national corporate bodies in 
public law opened the door for those new persons to exist forever on the 
threshold between “internal” and “international” jurisdictions. 
CODA 
…BUT NOT SO NEW AS THAT: THE NAZI CHALLENGE 
The Central European story of the juridical subjectivity of nations has 
an unexpected and powerful sting in its tail. In the hands of Austro-Marxists 
like Renner and Bauer, the construction of non-territorial national legal 
persons (within the frame of a federal imperial state) served “progressive” 
ends. Yet such legal projects had no necessary political anchoring, and ended 
up featuring not only in attempts to forge the Versailles order, but also to 
dismantle it. While Adolf Hitler’s National Socialists may have disdained 
the “juridification” of the interwar order, they too shared the crucial 
assumption that an ethnic group, quite apart from any correlation with the 
borders of a state, could and should be a legal subject. For them, it was the 
legal subject. Volkspersonlichkeit structured the territorial map and legal 
imaginary; in rejecting the empty abstraction of the state, they “turned the 
 
 41.  See CAROLE FINK, DEFENDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: THE GREAT POWERS, THE JEWS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL MINORITY PROTECTION (2004); Berman, supra note 6. 
 42.  See, e.g., Josef L. Kunz, Prolegomena zu einer allgemeinen Theorie des Internationalen Rechts 
nationaler Minderheiten, 12 Z OFFENT. R, 221–72 (1932). 
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folk-group into a collective legal entity.”43 Before Germany left the League, 
the German diplomat Friedrich von Keller explained their position before the 
League’s Sixth Committee in October 1933. Nations had “a natural and 
moral right,” he held, “to consider that all its members — even those 
separated from the mother country by State frontiers — constitute a moral 
and cultural whole.”44 (The similarity of his statements to Palacký’s 
sentiments, quoted above, is striking.) All of a sudden, the state’s 
containment of legal personality — previously the bedbug of progressive 
projects one and all — seemed to be a comforting convention. 
The following day, the British statesman William Ormsby-Gore — a 
man with paws all over the different facets of the interwar order — 
passionately refuted von Keller’s presentations, especially his sketch of an 
international relations founded on ethnic homogeneity, in which a state 
possessed the right and duty to concern itself with citizens of other states of 
the same ethnicity: 
That will carry us very far. I tremble to think of the responsibilities of my 
Government in respect of every citizen of the United States who claims 
decent from those who went over in the Mayflower — and there are 
millions — if this idea were put into operation. We reject absolutely this 
conception put forward by the German delegate regarding the racial 
homogeneity of political units and States. How could we do otherwise?45 
Edvard Beneš, Czechoslovakia’s Foreign Minister, readily agreed with 
Ormsby-Gore: “As I see it, this theory would, if carried to the extreme, 
overthrow all the legal conceptions upon which not only the Minorities 
Treaties, but also the international relations between States composed of two 
or more nationalities, are based.”46 Unlike his Bohemian forbears within the 
Austro-Hungarian empire, Beneš already had sovereign rights, which 
seemed (at least until 1938!) quite hard and real. The Czechs had switched 
roles: his task was now to defend the traditional order of state relations, and 
the privileges of sovereignty, and certainly not to experiment with legal 
subjects floating fluidly beyond state and territory. 
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